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Chapter 3
Chinese MNCs’ globalization, work and
employment
Chris Smith and Yu Zheng
The fear exists that these initial Chinese investments represent a
beachhead from which China will spread its own labour model into
Europe and that companies which are run by Chinese masters will
inevitably influence those that are not. As the president of the
dockworkers’ union at the Piraeus declared, ‘the result is that com -
panies not run by the Chinese are being influenced by what the
Chinese are doing in lowering labour costs and reducing workers'
rights’. (Meunier 2012: 8)
1. Introduction
The arrival of Chinese firms in Europe, America and the rest of the world
has elicited both excitement and anxiety. As the new investors are still
relatively unknown and the impact of their investment unclear, fears and
protectionist rhetoric that Chinese firms present unfair competition are
prevalent in the press and popular literature in both the United States
and Europe. Typical of these claims is the idea that Chinese investment
comes with implicit strings and can act as a ‘Trojan Horse’ (Meunier
2012: 7), affecting US and European norms and policies, from human
rights to labour laws. In Europe one widespread narrative is the challenge
posed by a new authoritarian investor with deep pockets to an open
market in crisis and its welfare capitalism model. Claims are legion that
all Chinese firms are state dominated. On labour issues, Chinese firms
are accused of breaking rules on working hours and health and safety;
using coercive forms of labour control – including withholding wages to
inhibit mobility – and taking a deposits to control migrant workers,
whether irregular or regular (Wu and Liu 2014); trafficking forced labour
(Gao 2004); ignoring or suppressing trade unions (Burgoon and Raess
2014); paying wages below subsistence levels; and even employing prison
labour on construction and civil engineering projects (Hairong and
Sautman 2012). 
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Much of this talk is underpinned by a protectionist standpoint, or is part
of a wider agenda demonizing Chinese investments. American
commentators reporting that Chinese investors are hostile to trade unions
is a bit rich, when US firms have resisted unionization at home and abroad
for decades (Royle and Towers 2002; Almond and Ferner 2006; Ferner
et al. 2013). Whenever newcomers enter a new space (whether nation or
region) there does need to be caution about over-valuing nationality and
reading capitalism through a myopic (and confusing) national lens. What
we need to do is separate out practices that are also used by others and
hence are systemic practices of capitalism, from those that are novel and
might come from societal differences and, finally, practices that may be
paradigmatic from a dominant lead country that create new trends in
work and employment (Smith and Meiksins 1995).
China, as an emerging capitalist state, is the origin of burgeoning MNCs
with diverse ownership structures: SOEs, joint ventures and private
firms. The state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that account for three-
quarters of Chinese investment overseas, possess complex ownership
patterns, including central state-backed, local state invested and hybrid
public–private forms (Goodman 2014). Overall, the SOEs are
characterized by relatively stable conditions of production, compliance
with national law and the presence of a union, although such practices
are often perpetuated by the introduction of sub-systems of casualized
labour relations (Cliff 2015). Chinese private firms are mostly small
family firms, expanding internationally through social networks (Wu and
Sheehan 2011; Ceccagno 2012; 2015). Some large-scale and established
private firms, such as Huawei and Geely, are found to be working with
host country institutions and developing new employment practices,
rather than reproducing their home labour regimes (Gugler and
Fetscherin 2011; Cooke 2012). China has become the home base for joint
ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries of MNCs from the Greater China
region – Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. Some of these are loop-line
Chinese investors: often foreign direct investment (FDI) is from the
People’s Republic of China, but labelled FDI to obtain benefits that go to
FDI in China. Some other firms have developed their production regimes
in China, such as Foxconn – the focus of this book. These Greater China
firms have shaped China’s economic growth as well as employment
relations (Henderson et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, as China’s move to a capitalist state has gone through
several experimental stages, it embraces a number of regional and sub-
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national development models. For example, business models have been
observed to be different in Guangdong, Sunan (Southern Jiangsu
Province), Wenzhou (Zhejiang Province), Zhongguancun (Beijing ‘Silicon
Valley’) and Chongqing (City) (Zhang and Peck 2014). Some distinctive
employment relations are embedded in the regional development models.
Structural differences also have implications for work organization and
employment relations when Chinese firms relocate abroad. 
China therefore does not present a single integrated model in terms of
development patterns, work organization and employment relations.
Chinese firms with different ownership structures show persistent
differences in terms of their work organization and employment relations
(Zhu et al. 2012). Foxconn carries with it imprints from its Taiwanese
origins, its expanded business and production model honed within
mainland China and its internationalization, dovetailing with generic
movements of neoliberalism and more casualized and fragmented labour
markets across the world, especially in Europe (see chapter by
Andrijasevic and Sacchetto in this book). Nevertheless, Foxconn is only
one case and perhaps an extreme one that could be labelled ‘bloody
Taylorism’ (Lipietz 1987) to emphasize the use of established production
models, but within more authoritarian or despotic contexts, in which the
state reinforces the power of capital and high reserves of labour dampen
labour activism. But the Foxconn case cannot simply be read through its
Chineseness, because this is like forming a full picture with only one piece
of the jigsaw. Rather, unpacking such ‘Chineseness’ will be a useful
starting point for us to better understand the country-of-origin effects
that often inform work and employment practices adopted by Chinese
MNCs, such as Foxconn. 
Any attempt to discuss the Chinese model in the EU must also take into
account the host country contexts that can impede and challenge the
same strategies in different ways and with different outcomes. A major
problem with using the framework of an integrated Chinese capitalist
firm moving from China to Europe and applying or adapting (Abo 1994)
practices from home or in the new host society (central to the
Japanization and Americanization debates in the past, Elger and Smith
2005) is that China patently lacks an integrated model to export and the
EU, while a space of 28 countries with free movement of labour, is
nevertheless not an integrated ‘host’ society. While national institutional
regulations persist across the EU, there are also new developments, such
as posted workers, social dumping and casualization, that allow workers
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to slip through regulatory cracks and for new segmented labour markets
to be created (Caro et al. 2015; Friberg et al. 2014; Refslund 2014). These
new spaces can create segments for migrant workers, brought from low-
wage economies within or outside the EU through employer or contractor
or employment agency dependent routes, as a result of which they are
living in marginal conditions and institutionally separate from their host
society. These new structures in Europe’s labour market mean that when
new capital comes – such as Chinese firms – they can utilize these new
practices and reproduce marginalization and segmentation, rather than
simply conform to an EU-wide set of ‘host’ practices or specific practices
in individual host countries. When newcomers do not conform to EU or
country institutional rules a common reaction to these firms – especially
new arrivals that stand out in the society, such as the Chinese – is to
stigmatize and nationalize/ethnicize the practices they apply as
something alien and new, when in fact they may only be reproducing (and
perhaps extending or adding their own colour to) what already exists or
is emerging in the new regional spaces of differentiating European labour
markets. Therefore when we assess the work and employment practices
of newcomers we must always be careful not to confuse the application
of practices by the new arrival, rather than the emergent practices within
the structure of the labour market.
With these brief analytical caveats to approaching Chinese companies
overseas, this chapter reviews what we currently know about the nature
of work and employment inside Chinese MNCs’ overseas operations,
especially in Europe. We will examine the scale and pattern of Chinese
outward foreign direct investment. We aim to compare what we know
about work and employment in China – which is fragmented between
continued paternalism, modern human resource management and
coercive forms of labour control – with the situation of Chinese MNCs
overseas, especially in Europe. There is limited research into work and
employment relations in overseas Chinese MNCs and our conclusion calls
for more research to address our knowledge gap. 
2. Chinese work and employment practices – home
and away
In China the transition from state socialism to capitalism has been
accompanied by many attempts to frame the nature of ‘home-based’ work
and employment practices (Liu and Smith forthcoming). Attention has
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been given to the way labour is attached to employment and organiza -
tions, with heavy use of internal migrants, an internal passport (hukou)
system, casualization of labour contracts and radical breaks from former
long-term bonds of dependency between worker and workplace (Lee and
Friedman 2010; Kuruvilla et al. 2011). A very mixed picture of Chinese
labour process emergences as an outcome of some 30 years of theorizing
and empirical engagement with reform and transformation.
In an early work, Lee (1998) compared labour regimes in Hong Kong and
China to note that in China there was what she called ‘disorganized
despotism’. A massive unskilled, rural migrant work force has arisen and
a lack of properly functioning social institutions providing welfare or
representing workers’ interests. This has led to a situation of managerial
domination inside factories, with unfettered power to discipline workers
and control recreation relations, not just lives in the factories (Lee 1998;
Smith 2003; Smith and Ngai 2006; Chan and Ngai 2009; Lüthje et al.
2013a). High labour turnover was initially the primary means of labour
resistance, although with the new generation of Chinese workers (those
born after 1990) strikes and workplace resistance were added to high
labour churn as a sign of new found freedoms (Liu 2014; Zhang 2015).
In follow-up research, Lee (2007) divided labour regimes in China into
two industry types: ‘sunrise’ (export-oriented, assembly factories around
the coast – what can be referred to as the ‘Guangdong model’) were
contrasted with ‘sunset’ industries (reforming and declining former SOEs
in the North). She suggested that each possesses its own labour regime,
labour supply and working class politics. More recently, Lüthje et al.
(2013a) tried to further differentiate production regimes within China.
These authors identified four divergent patterns of work organization:
SOEs, joint ventures, private export-oriented manufacturers and low-end
subcontractors. The state-owned enterprises are characterized by
relatively stable conditions of production, compliance with national law
and the presence of a union. The joint ventures tend to copy traditional
Western company styles, paying higher wages and investing in skills and
education. While individual labour contracts are commonly used to
regulate employment relations, written collective agreements do not exist.
The private export-orientated manufacturers diverge into high-end and
low-end producers, which exhibit different labour sub-regimes – with
divergent wages, working hours, labour intensiveness and more or less
hostile managerial regimes. And finally, there are low-end subcontractors,
particularly in the garment, toy and shoe industries. ‘[M]odern manufac -
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turing technologies are combined with massive flexibilization of employ -
ment and large-scale exploitation of migrant workers, including long
work hours, violation of legal standards and low wages and usually no
presence of unions’ (Zajak 2012: 84–86).
Against the reading of a mixed China labour story, others see rather a
dominant form of ‘bloody Taylorism’ (Lipietz 1987), epitomized by an
extended reading of the work regime enunciated by Foxconn. As chapters
in this book make clear, this labour regime is characterized by military
discipline and ideology; task simplification; and intensive work
combining production and reproduction of labour power in huge
industrial compounds that function like enclosed cities (Pun and Chan
2010; and this volume). 
Such despotic employment relations are enabled by China’s national
institutions, but are they also enclosed by national institutions? Studies
on how changes in China and in global markets have affected some of
these models may shed some light on a potential answer. In particular,
the low-wage export-orientated model faces upward pressure on wages,
the rising cost of materials, a rising yuan (until recently) and more rigid
labour legislation (after the implementation of 2008/2009 Labour
Contract Law), alongside unprecedented external dynamics (for example,
slackening global demand after the 2008 global financial crisis). Added
to which the Guangdong local government has expressed a desire to move
up the value chain (Zhu and He 2014). Such institutional pressure has
affected the export-oriented manufacturing model only to some extent. 
In a systematic study of two sectors (LED lighting and textiles and
garments), Butollo (2014) observes increased use of high value
technology and declines in labour use as the capital intensity of these
industries expands, but he does not observe a corresponding rise in wages
or improvements in working conditions. He suggests an underlying ‘low
cost, low trust, high control’ managerial regime across a range of sectors,
impervious to typical levers of change, such as labour shortages,
upskilling and rising capital intensity of industry, all of which have not
shifted Chinese management from its tight control regime. Firms that did
not shut down in the recession moved within China to cheaper production
sites and new entrants to the export sector ‘went west’ and not to the
coast. Some others internationalized to other Asian countries, such as
Vietnam and Malaysia, in order to maintain or prolong the low-cost
labour regime (Zhu and He 2014).
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Differences in employment and work systems in China suggest there is
not a single dominant labour process model, except perhaps a
management focus on tight cost control, competition and authoritarian
control. When MNCs expand overseas for the first time the question is
always whether they are taking what they know and do with them, or
running away from home-country practices to develop new ways of
working in host societies (see Elger and Smith 2005 for a review). It
might be that many of the practices prevailing in China cannot move
overseas, as they are tied to Chinese-based institutions. However, as
shown by existing research on MNCs, firms can potentially preserve their
labour policies through internal and external migration. As noted in the
work of Sacchetto and Andrijasevic (2014, see chapter in this book) in
the Czech Republic Foxconn used migrant labour from Romania and
Bulgaria in order to lower labour costs and recruited through agencies to
segment the workforce; this would seem to exemplify the transfer of rigid
labour controls found in China. We must also not forget that the MNC is
not an integrated actor doing the same things everywhere. This misses
the importance of firm strategy, which can choose or be pushed through
internal politics to do different things in different contexts. To further the
understanding of Chinese MNCs in Europe, we must first know where
they are and who they are. 
3. Outward foreign direct investment from China
Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) is still relatively small
in scale. Total OFDI worldwide was 870.4 billion US dollars by mid-2014,
including both actual investment projects and investment contracts
(UNCTAD 2015). Its growth, however, has been impressive, although
uneven. The average growth rate of Chinese OFDI during between 2005
and 2014 was 40 per cent (ibid.). By 2013, 15,300 Chinese investment
entities had established nearly 25,400 overseas business units in 184
countries. Total overseas employees number 1.97 million, while 967,000
were recruited locally (MOC 2014).
The surge of Chinese OFDI in the early 2000s stemmed from the
country’s ‘Go Global’ policy, which linked Chinese OFDI to the nation’s
development strategy (Voss et al. 2010). It is not random, but top down
and directed. Early Chinese OFDI was concentrated in developing
countries, but investment in developed countries is rapidly catching up.
Excluding investment to some offshore financial centres and potential
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round-trip investment (often through Hong Kong) (see Figure 1), the
share of investment in developed countries has been on the rise, from 32
per cent in 2003 to 46 per cent in 2013. 
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Figure 1 China’s OFDI and cross-border acquisitions, 1982–2006 (million $US)  
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Figure 2 Chinese outward foreign direct investment flow worldwide 2003 vs.
2012 (million $US)
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Europe accounted for 8.1 per cent of Chinese OFDI stock by 2013. China’s
FDI stock reached 103.87 billion US dollars by mid-2014, which is just
over 1 per cent of the EU’s total inward FDI stock. By number, 75 per cent
of investments are made by private firms. By value, in contrast, more than
72 per cent is from state-owned enterprises. Seven deals account for the
overwhelming share of the total SOE deal value: CIC’s purchase of GDF
Suez’s exploration business (3.2 billion US dollars), Yantai Wanhua
Polyurethanes’s purchase of BorsodChem Zrt (1.7 billion US dollars),
PetroChina’s purchase of INEOS Group’s European assets (1.0 billion US
dollars), Sinochem’s acquisition of Emerald Energy (878 million US
dollars) and ChemChina’s acquisition of Rhodia Silicones (504 million
US dollars) and Drakkar Holdings (507 million US dollars). These firms
also top the ranking of biggest government-controlled investors, together
with China Ocean Shipping Group (Hanemann and Rosen 2012). 
The strong involvement of SOEs in investment stands out, which creates
the impression that 
increasingly, Chinese companies are showing an appetite for
infrastructure projects that can build up chains of influence and help
with distribution channels in Europe, such as ports (for example,
Piraeus in Greece, Rijeka in Croatia), airports (for example, Parchim
airport in Germany, Larnaca in Cyprus) and railways (for example,
in Slovenia and Hungary). (Meunier 2012: 3)
In reality, Chinese OFDI is much more diverse in terms of both industrial
sectors and investment destinations. Although the resource sector receives
the largest share of Chinese OFDI, the manufacturing and service sectors
are catching up. In Europe, a high share of Chinese investment has gone
into a handful of large-scale acquisitions in capital intensive sectors, in
particular the energy sector. The wholesale and retail sector has attracted
the largest number of Chinese invested projects. In the manufacturing
sector, Chinese firms have targeted in particular the automotive industry
(for example, Geely’s purchase of Volvo Cars in Sweden, Great Wall
Motors in Bulgaria, BYD automobiles in Hungary and London Taxi
Company in the United Kingdom, with a major investment announced in
March 2015 (BBC 2015); industrial machinery (for example, Sany’s acqui -
sition of Putzmeister in Germany); and information and communica tion
technology (for example, Huawei in Hungary, China Unicom in the United
Kingdom). The financial services sector has also attracted Chinese in -
vestors in selected countries (for example, ICBC in the United Kingdom).
Chinese MNCs’ globalization, work and employment
75Flexible workforces and low profit margins: electronics assembly between Europe and China
Geographically, most Chinese investments are in ‘old Europe’: the EU15
attracted more than 85 per cent of total investments between 2000 and
2013. The top destinations are the United Kingdom and Luxemburg,
followed by France, Norway and Germany – from 2005 to 2014, those
five countries received 78 per cent of the annual investment in the EU
(Figure 4). Outliers are Hungary and Greece, with both countries
receiving one large-scale investment that pushed them up the rankings.
China has favoured mergers and acquisitions in western European
countries. Hungary received a 1.9 billion US dollar investment in the
chemical sector from the sale of BorsodChem to Yantai Wanhua
Polyurethanes. Greece awarded China’s COSCO a long-term lease in the
port of Piraeus, which was tied to an investment of more than 700 million
US dollars for modernization of the port’s container terminal. Sweden
fares well in the European ranks, thanks to the 1.5 billion US dollar
acquisition of Volvo Cars by Geely and related follow-up investments. The
new EU member states of central and eastern Europe, by contrast, have
seen almost entirely greenfield investments (Hanemann and Rosen 2012:
4). Hungary in 2010 received more OFDI from China than all other CEE
countries combined. Another high performer is Romania, attracting
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Figure 3 Chinese OFDI flow by industry sector, 2013 (million $US)  
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several greenfield manufacturing investments. This includes a plant of
Shantuo Agricultural Machinery Equipment to produce tractors
(Hanemann and Rosen 2012). The speculation is that 
The rise of Chinese investment in CEE countries can be explained
by a combination of CEE economies serving as a manufacturing
base supplying Western Europe and the perception that the political
climate is more conducive to Chinese investments than in Western
Europe. (Meunier 2012: 3)
If we compare levels of Chinese OFDI with those of Japan, then we can
see that by 1974 over 85 per cent of all Japanese OFDI, excluding
investments in facilities for processing timber and pulp for the Japanese
market (which are heavily concentrated in western Canada), was found
in developing countries, although there were considerable services
investments in the United States. Infrastructure projects are more
common in developing countries for the obvious reason that it is in these
countries where there is a lack of investment in these areas and improving
road, airports and ports is often designed to both assist with exporting
raw materials to China and importing finished goods from China. China
is different from the earlier Japanese pattern inasmuch as it is more
widespread globally and not just focused on Asia, but there are also some
similarities in the spreading of investments from Asia. Japan’s OFDI
focused on Asia, with over 50 per cent by 1997. Korea exhibited a similar
pattern and by 1978 it had more than half of its OFDI going to Asia. As
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Figure 4 Chinese OFDI stock in selected EU countries by the end of 2013
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Korea developed the distribution of OFDI shifted – following a pattern
that China looks likely to reproduce – so by 1994 Korea’s OFDI in Asia
had fallen to about 41.9 per cent, with North America hosting 35.3 per
cent of Korean OFDI and Europe 12.8 per cent.
4. Employment, firm size and working practices in
Chinese firms overseas
The globalization of Chinese business has attracted theoretical attention,
especially around questions of motivation, strategy and differences
between the patterns of ‘Chinese’ OFDI compared with more established
or ‘Western’ practices (Berning and Holtbrügge 2012; Deng 2012). What
remains far less researched is how the management of work and
employment relations practices within different types of Chinese MNCs
develop outside China as they interact with diverse host national contexts.
As pointed out earlier, a number of key characteristics of Chinese firms
have presented significant challenges to investigating work and
employment of Chinese investment firms through the lens of existing
frameworks. 
One of these characteristics is that Chinese investment firms are relatively
small, which makes aligning the Chinese case with the existing debate on
the internationalization of work regimes problematic. A survey of Chinese
firms in Italy by Pietrobelli and colleagues (2010) had data on
employment for only 52 of the 68 companies they surveyed, but this
revealed that 38 per cent of the companies were small or very small (with
10–50 employees). This result was in keeping with those in the United
Kingdom. Only 10 out of the 169 Chinese invested firms have employed
more than 150 employees. The majority of Chinese operations have fewer
than 25 employees. But as noted above, investments have been increasing
in scale and a bifurcation of Chinese firms by size may be emerging. Major
investments are from SOEs or Chinese MNCs and not small firms that
are produced through labour-based social networks, not capital accumu -
lation on a larger scale. 
Another challenge is that the thesis of global transfer of ‘national
paradigms’ is built on the assumption that firms reproduce their
advantages that originated in the home country through the diffusion of
management practices. Many Chinese MNCs start their internation -
alization because they lack competitive advantages at home (Child and
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Rodrigues 2005). The representative ‘country of origin’ advantages of
Chinese firms, however, are believed to be bound to China– with access
to pools of educated, inexpensive labour; strong state support; a large
internal market permitting experimentation and segmented marketing;
and legacies of collective and coercive labour management regimes. The
implication is that there are incentives to remain at home for Chinese
MNCs and that there is no standard model of working that is ‘firm specific
and codified’ and available to be transferred through the international
firm as work and management practices remain tied to Chinese
institutions and not Chinese firms. This echoes much the same
conclusion that was reached about the Japanese management practices
prior to the take-off of Japanese FDI in the mid-1970s. Before the 1970s,
it was thought the Japanese firm was ‘embedded within Japanese society,
tied through social networks, national institutions, cultural practices and
state policies to the territory of the country’ (Elger and Smith 2005: 3).
When Japanese OFDI accelerated, there was an intense research focus
on the management and work organization practices of Japanese firms
abroad. A broad conclusion then was that that there was uneven (by
sector and country) transfer and transformation of Japanese
management practices through the experience of internationalization
(see Elger and Smith 2005 for a review). Internationalization allowed for
a more complete understanding of the distinct character of the Japanese
firm. We suggest the same strategy could be adopted in understanding
the Chinese firm. We follow Child (2009) in questioning the cultural-
relativist or country-centred approach to the problem as this starts with
the unrealistic claim that China has totally ‘unique’ management
practices, rather than analysing the content and meaning of these
practices within their context and diversity and through comparators
from others elsewhere. This approach allows us to distil the core
ingredients of a Chinese management system through the internation -
alization of Chinese firms. 
4.1 A fledging new employer? Adapting, ignoring or reforming
local rules
Research into Chinese MNCs in Europe and their attitudes towards local
institutions remains very patchy. There is a lot of rhetoric based on
simplistic assumptions about Chinese investment and the openness of
European economies to receive this investment, alongside changes in the
nature of work and employment. The reasoning is based on China being
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a new capitalist state with money, power and influence over a crisis-ridden
and fractured European economy. Typical of this rhetoric is Meunier
(2012; 2014a and 2014b) who in various publications rings the (American)
alarm about Chinese investment in Europe. An example is the quote at
the beginning of this chapter. It seems that investment from emerging
countries is ‘scarier’ than other forms of investment (see Aguzzoli and
Geary 2014 for a similar discourse on Brazilian investment in Canada).
Such a simplistic reading of Chinese OFDI’s dominance in Europe is
questionable and Chinese firms have been found to be adapting their
strategic approach in the face of institutions in various EU countries
(Jacoby 2014). Workplace-based research on Chinese MNCs in EU is very
rare and therefore a definite picture is not available. What empirical
research does exist does not help as it presents a mixed picture. Zhu and
Wei’s (2014) recent case study based on a Chinese takeover of an Italian
motorcycle company suggests that the Chinese MNC is very capable of
taking a pragmatic approach and embracing local norms. They observed
that the newly acquired Italian subsidiary grew by offering technical
workers temporary contracts because this was a standard practice in Italy
due to the relative surplus of technically qualified labour. This is in
contrast to the situation in China, where qualified technical workers were
offered long-term contracts as a standard retention measure due to the
shortage of such workers. We are reminded here that investment by
Chinese firms is subject to economic calculations as with other private
firms and it is misplaced to treat China differently: ‘The selection of
investment targets requires arduous work by Chinese firms and is
undertaken for commercial reasons, not at the behest of back-room
political strategists’ (Hanemann and Rosen 2012: 6). 
What we know from studies outside the EU is that Chinese MNCs take a
fairly pragmatic approach in dealing with labour market institutions in
the host country. One, possibly the best known Chinese MNC Huawei
does not impose an ideological ‘no union’ policy, but works with the
locality (Cooke 2012). Despite their strong preference for labour sourced
from China, some SOEs, due to pressure from local unions, have to use
local workers and work with local institutions (Lee 2009; Chen and Orr
2009; Corkin 2012; Mohan 2013). This kind of selective adaptation is
likely to be what Chinese firms take with them to the EU.
Host country institutions are never passive or simply embrace whatever
employment practices are brought by MNCs. Europe’s trade unionists do
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not see FDI though value-laden nationalist lens, but much more in terms
of the length of investment and the attitudes of investors towards local
institutions. One of the few studies to examine this notes: 
the labor officials with whom we spoke generally do not perceive
Chinese investors differently than other foreign investors, be it
American, Japanese, or else [sic]. Union leaders and works
councillors do not look upon foreign investors through the prism of
the national origin of capital. Instead, two lenses appear to be
prevalent, whether the investment is driven by short- or long-term
profitability considerations (‘finance’ vs ‘productive’ investments);
and how foreign investors take comfort in relation to labor laws and
practices. (Burgoon and Raess 2014: 185)
4.2 Global mobility? Workforce control through expatriation
The development of employment practices in China has often been
linked to the retained internal mobility of Chinese workers (Knight and
Song 2005). As Chinese firms internationalize, control of labour mobility
has also been one of the central issues. Heavy use of employees sourced
from the home country has been reported as a consistent feature of
Chinese FDI (Cooke 2012; 2014; Zheng and Smith 2015). For example,
the Turkish subsidiary of Huawei in Istanbul employed 1,000 employees,
but 200 of them were Chinese – a high expatriate rate (one in five) looks
to be unique within the framework of internationalization, even in a
country such as Turkey where wage costs are not as high as in western
Europe. Huawei subsidiaries in India had 30 per cent expatriates (Cooke
2012: 1844) – again exceptionally high. Huawei has more domestic
employees than those working in the 140 overseas subsidiaries, but from
2008 more revenue was generated overseas than in the PRC. Like many
Chinese MNCs Huawei has a competitive advantage in having a large
pool of inexpensive workers in the home territory and therefore one of
the reasons for OFDI is not to evade the high costs of domestic labour,
as in the case of many western MNCs and Chinese MNCs try to create
internal employment structures to continue to access labour reserves at
home. 
As a developing country, Chinese people (students, workers, entre -
preneurs) seek international opportunities and therefore move
independently of MNCs and can provide a source of labour for newly
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arriving Chinese firms. Europe experienced an accelerated growth of its
Chinese population, from 0.60 million in 1980 to 2.15 million in 2007
(Wu and Latham 2014: 304). While the United Kingdom and France have
the biggest Chinese populations (1.1 million between them), southern and
smaller European economies have seen the highest rates of Chinese
population growth: Italy increased from 70,000 in 1998 to 300,000 in
2008; Spain from 35,000 to 168,000; and Romania, from 3,000 to
10,000 (ibid.: 305). Increased trade between Europe and China,
increased consumer power in China, internationalization of higher
education and internationalization of Chinese firms are all factors
associated with the increased presence of Chinese people working in
Europe. A feature highlighted in Wu and Latham’s (2014) discussion of
Chinese migration to Europe is the ‘transnationality of Chinese
entrepreneurs’ (who move quickly across European countries (especially
the Schengen treaty zone); the continued strong links to China, strong
ethnic-communities (often characterized by ‘closure, segmentation and
fragmentation’ (ibid.: 316) and a blend of legal and illegal movements.
The internationalization of Chinese firms and the mobilization of Chinese
workers both demonstrate attempts to retain coercive controls over the
freedom of Chinese workers overseas to move to other employers and
move around the labour market. Chinese workers are there because they
follow controls, they are more focused on work and as migrants usually
living in company-based industrial dormitories they are tightly controlled
and more likely to focus on work during the contract period and submit
to compulsory overtime, which is resisted by local workers and work
flexibly with less voice, which again is often against practices pursued by
locals. Ethnic enclaves of Chinese businesses overseas reinforce home-
country habits, as do language barriers, lack of awareness of host society
practices or hostility in host societies towards new migrants. Lee’s (2009)
work on Chinese managers and workers working in Africa as extended
expatriates (Zheng and Smith 2015) in Chinese MNCs, suggests patterns
of tied employment, not unlike Kafala practices in the Middle East (Roper
and Barria 2008; Khan and Harroff-Tavel 2011), all of which equates with
unfree labour. In this context simply changing employers or moving out
of ethnic enclave employment into local society employment can be seen
as an aspect of class struggle or labour resistance and the assertion of
mobility rights by Chinese workers (Wu and Liu 2014). These struggles
and constraints are an important part of Chinese workers’ international
experience.
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What warrants further investigation is the contestation between an
emerging force of capitalist firms and a wider pool of labour. Altreiter,
Fibich and Flecker (2015) argue that as work relocation and labour
mobility increase, employment conditions and labour relations may be
undermined ‘through a dis-embedding of employment relations’ (ibid.:
67). Chinese firms, being a new force in international capital and with the
capacity to deploy an international workforce, produce this changing
mobility of work and workers. So far, however, no empirical evidence
supports the emergence of such a context-free model from Chinese firms
overseas. However, we have observed a split between the employment
practices adopted to manage Chinese workers and locals. This leads to
our last point about diverging employment practices among a global
workforce. 
4.3 A double-faced master? Diverging employment practices in
Chinese MNCs
Several authors have observed a dualism in Chinese subsidiaries: directly
employed and indirectly employed workers on different labour contracts,
benefits and wages. Some authors argue that management dualism
denotes learning by absorbing ‘advanced’ local practices and diffusing
them back to the home firm rather than transferring from home base to
subsidiaries (Zhang and Edwards 2007). In particular, Chinese MNC
subsidiaries in developed countries tend toward ‘localization’ due to their
purpose of asset-seeking, tangible or nontangible (Cooke 2008). 
Others may argue that dualistic features of employment reflect what some
see as the emerging dualism in China. Zhang’s (2008; 2015) study of the
Chinese auto industry suggested there were dual labour management
systems, what she called ‘lean-and-dual’. While both contract workers
and agency workers worked side by side with formally employed direct
workers, for formal workers there was ‘hegemonic control’, with high
wages, generous benefits, better working conditions and relatively secure
employment, while for agency, contract and other temporary workers
(close to 50 per cent of the workforce) there were ‘despotic labour
controls’: lower wages and insecure employment. But this is not especially
a Chinese pattern, as parts of the auto industry in the United Kingdom –
the BMW Mini-plant in Oxford, for example – has just such a pattern,
with 800 of the 2,500 workers recruited through agencies and on
insecure contracts (Macalister and Pidd 2009). Similarly, Nissan in
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Canton and Mitsubishi in the United States use temporary workers in
40–50 per cent of positions and are winding back regular employees
(Jaffe 2014).
It seems therefore that agency workers are becoming a generic or
systemic (not national) feature of employment in the some industries,
allowing manufacturers to adjust more easily to changes in demand, both
up and down and not something particular to one country or company.
This highlights the need, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter,
for researchers and policymakers to examine employment and work
organization practices in context, case-by-case and to separate systemic
from local and dominant best practices, rather than to project linear
movement towards either divergence or convergence (Smith and
Meiksins 1995).
5. Conclusion
China is emerging from a developing to a significant globally dominant
economy. ‘Very few transitional economies have undergone industrial
restructuring, urbanization and the adoption of various market-oriented
reforms simultaneously, as China is now doing’ (Cai 2010: 22). However,
three decades of reform have created a puzzle when it comes to
characterizing the nature of work and employment in the Chinese firm.
Heterodoxy and diversity rule and China-centred research has not
answered the question of what constitutes a ‘Chinese way of managing
people’. The problem, we suggest, may be that the research focus has been
‘country centred’ and not ‘practices centred’. Given the size and diversity
of China, researchers have produced models and ideas that reflect back
that diversity, without any clear direction and implication for the
evolution of the Chinese firm as it internationalizes. From being the main
site for foreign direct investment, we are now witnessing quantum growth
in Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and this new
development has created further puzzles about whether China ‘abroad’
is following ‘Western’ patterns (in terms of international company forms,
strategies, motivations and competitive advantages); HR processes
(recruitment, selection, rewarding, expatriation) and norms (conforming
to local institutional rules and laws); or breaking from these norms; or
coevolving new rules between firms and local states/governments.
Paradoxically, we suggest that we will better understand the Chinese firm
at home by studying the management practices of Chinese firms overseas
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in a variety of sectors, countries and regions. We anticipate that what
Chinese firms are doing overseas will also influence what they do at home
– that there will be some coevolution in practices – as the testing of
practices within the overseas context both legitimates and
institutionalizes them for application at home. Moreover, given the
stepping up of Chinese OFDI, we can no longer begin an accurate
characterization of what working practices are within Chinese firms,
without the international dimension being brought into the picture. 
There is interaction between home and international practices where
Chinese firms are internationalizing; therefore research needs to study
the dynamic interaction between the continued changes to the old system
within China and the ‘modernization’ processes evolving through
internationalization. ‘The complexity and range of organizations and
environmental sectors in China make it unlikely that a single, all-
encompassing Chinese theory of management will prove adequate’ (Child
2009: 70). However, by studying the Chinese firm outside China we will
have a more robust understanding of the core characteristics of the
Chinese business system overall. 
We are just starting to examine the impact of Chinese investment on work
and employment relations in Europe. One line of argument is that
Chinese firms are a threat to EU institutions and labour practices. This
assumes that Chinese investors are integrated (when they are diverse)
and homogenous in policy terms, when there may be sector and
ownership differences within Chinese investments, as well as in the
different host-society institutional environments. Another line is that
Chinese are new players and as such they will take time to learn the local
rules. However, 
there appears to be a shared sentiment among practitioners, market
and academic analysts that Chinese investors initially got many
things wrong due to a lack of experience in dealing with business and
labor in Europe, but they have learnt to allay concerns, for instance
by pledging to safeguard jobs or embrace collective-bargaining
practices. (Burgoon and Raess 2014: 186, emphasis added) 
The problem with this line is that it assumes that local rules are
immutable, when they are changing (the rise of flexible working across
all European countries, for example) and it assumes stasis, when both
newcomers and local environments are dynamic. 
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China is not set in stone either, but in a period of transition and there
might be some co-evolution of employment relations at home and
overseas. In a recent review of labour relations in China, Liu (2014: 117)
noted that 
the evolving Chinese labor regime has met growing resistance from
workers, as reflected in the rising number of labor protests that
circumvent both the legal system and state corporatist arrange -
ments. However, the authoritarian labor regime has caused worker
activism to be fragmented and lack cross-factory, cross-region
mobilization and actions. Nevertheless, several notable changes in
worker activism with the potential to unmake the authoritarian
labor regime have emerged in the past several years. 
When we look at Chinese MNCs overseas there is no reason to assume
that the patterns of the emerging labour struggles at home will not find
their way into Chinese firms overseas. 
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